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Abstract 
We propose an embodied system based on the free energy 
principle (FEP) for sensorimotor visual perception. We 
evaluated it in a character-recognition task using the MNIST 
dataset. Although the FEP has successfully described a rule that 
living things obey mathematically and claims that a biological 
system continues to change its internal models and behaviors to 
minimize the difference in predicting sensory input, it is not 
enough to model sensorimotor visual perception. An 
embodiment of the system is the key to achieving sensorimotor 
visual perception. The proposed embodied system is configured 
by a body and memory. The body has an ocular motor system 
controlling the direction of eye gaze, which means that the eye 
can only observe a small focused area of the environment. The 
memory is not photographic, but is a generative model 
implemented with a variational autoencoder that contains prior 
knowledge about the environment, and that knowledge is 
classified. By limiting body and memory abilities and operating 
according to the FEP, the embodied system repeatedly takes 
action to obtain the next sensory input based on various 
potentials of future sensory inputs. In the evaluation, the 
inference of the environment was represented as an approximate 
posterior distribution of characters (0–9). As the number of 
repetitions increased, the attention area moved continuously, 
gradually reducing the uncertainty of characters. Finally, the 
probability of the correct character became the highest among 
the characters. Changing the initial attention position provides a 
different final distribution, suggesting that the proposed system 
has a confirmation bias. 
Introduction 
The human visual field seems to cover a wide area of the 
surrounding environment, but the range with high enough 
resolution to identify the shape and color of the target object is 
limited to only the central visual field of about 5 degrees 
(Mandelbaum, J. and Sloan, L. L., 1947). Since the human 
visual field has this spatial limitation, it is necessary to move 
the gazing position to obtain environmental information (see) 
in a wide area. This leads to a phenomenon called sensorimotor 
contingency (hereafter called SMC; O’Regan, J. K. and Noë, 
A., 2001; Seth, A.K., 2015), which changes the interpretation 
of “seeing” (Land, M. F., 2006; Friston, K. and Kiebel, S., 
2009; Seth, A.K. et al., 2012; Adams, R. A. et al., 2013; 
Bogacz, R., 2017; Lotter, W., 2017). Human sensorimotor 
visual perception makes “seeing” knowing about things to do 
rather than making an internal representation. In other words, 
experience is not something we feel but something we do 
(O’Regan, J. K., 2001). This is because human sensorimotor 
visual perception infers the environmental state, not the sensory 
input itself. Therefore, the spatial limitation of the human visual 
field is not a “limitation” but is actually a “trigger” for an action 
that moves the gazing position. 
 In machine learning, many methods have been proposed that 
incorporate various characteristics and phenomena found in 
humans. The spatial limitations of the human body, such as that 
described above, are treated as constraints called partial 
observation in the context of reinforcement learning (Pineau, J. 
et al., 2003; Ji, S. et al., 2007; Silver, D. and Veness, J., 2010). 
These papers evaluated the degree of performance degradation 
by partial observation in classification and regression 
problems, assuming that not all necessary information can be 
obtained in most practical cases. In terms of classification and 
regression performance, the spatial limitations are certainly 
constraints and not treated as “triggers” for actions. Various 
models and algorithms similar to SMC have also been 
proposed. Auto regressive models (Gregor, K. et al., 2015; 
Oord, A. et al., 2016; Salimans, T. et al., 2017) predict the entire 
image by repeating the action of obtaining a partial image. 
Algorithms that generate exploring actions for reinforcement 
learning (Oh, J. et al., 2015; Houthooft, R. et al., 2016) 
contribute to finding optimum solutions by covering a wide 
range of the action space without bias. These models and 
algorithms generate the actions not on a basis of inference of 
environmental states but on that of sensory inputs such as 
partial images and observations in reinforcement learning. 
None of the above studies have achieved the inference of 
environmental states, which is the essence of human 
sensorimotor visual perception. 
 The purpose of this study is to achieve human sensorimotor 
visual perception using the free energy principle (hereafter 
called FEP; Friston, K. et al., 2006; Friston, K. J., 2010; 
McGregor, S. et al., 2015; Friston, K. et al., 2017; Buckley, C. 
L. et al., 2017). The FEP mathematically describes the principle 
that living things obey. The free energy in the FEP measures 
the difference between the probability distribution of 
environmental states that act on a biological system and an 
approximate posterior distribution of environmental states 
encoded by the configuration of that system. The biological 
system minimizes the free energy by changing its configuration 
to affect the way it samples the environment or by changing the 
approximate posterior distribution it encodes. These two 
changes correspond to action and perception, respectively, and 
lead to “active inference” and “perceptual inference.” The 
biological system thus encodes an implicit and probabilistic 
model of the environment. 
  
Although the FEP has successfully described a biological 
system of performing active and perceptual inferences 
mathematically, it is not enough to model human sensorimotor 
visual perception. An embodiment of this system is the key to 
achieving human sensorimotor visual perception. The 
embodiment provides an interaction between the biological 
system and environment, resulting in sensory inputs and 
actions, and the causal relationship between these is stored in 
the biological system (Fitzpatrick, P. et al., 2003; Cheng, G. et 
al., 2006; Friston, K., 2011; Gallagher, S. and Allen, M., 2018). 
 In this paper, we propose an embodied system based on FEP 
to achieve sensorimotor visual perception. The proposed 
embodied system is configured by a body, which partially 
observes the environment, and memory, which has classified 
prior knowledge about the environment as a generative model. 
Evaluation using the MNIST dataset (LeCun, Y. and Cortes, 
C., 1998) shows that the proposed system triggers an action that 
moves a gazing position and repeatedly performs active and 
perceptual inferences by following the FEP. Moreover, the 
intentionality is reproduced on the proposed system, producing 
an equivalent of human confirmation bias. We discuss how 
important this bias is for taking the action in an unknown 
environment. 
Sensorimotor Visual Perception 
To list the components necessary for achieving sensorimotor 
visual perception, the following problem settings are 
considered. Figure 1 shows an overview of our problem setting. 
Let us consider a situation in which there is an object to be 
perceived, e.g., the number 5, in the environment and the vision 
sensor is used to perceive it. The situation is called an 
environmental state 𝑥𝑡. The vision sensor replaces the role of 
the human eye and has a spatial limitation of the visual field. 
The spatial limitation leads to a change in direction of the vision 
sensor to obtain images in the wide area of the environment. 
When the direction of the vision sensor is determined in a 
certain direction, an image of a specific region of the 
environment is obtained. A representative position of the region 
(for example, the position of the upper left corner of the region) 
is defined as an attention position, which equals the gazing 
position of the human eye. The image of the region is defined 
as an attention image. The attention image at each time point 
( 𝑇 = 𝑡 − 2, t − 1, t ) is obtained by the previous actions 
𝑎𝑡−3, 𝑎𝑡−2, 𝑎𝑡−1  that move the attention position every time 
step. A composition image of the attention images obtained up 
to the current time 𝑇 = 𝑡 is used as a sensory input (hereafter 
called sensory input image 𝑠𝑡 ). As described above, 
sensorimotor visual perception is to perceive the object (the 
number 5) in the environment by repeating the actions to obtain 
𝑠𝑡 . Our goal of this study is to achieve sensorimotor visual 
perception based on FEP. 
 Free Energy Principle 
The FEP mathematically describes the perceptual and active 
inferences. In our problem setting, the sensory input image 𝑠𝑡 
is determined by the previous action 𝑎𝑡−1  and the current 
environmental state 𝑥𝑡. The 𝑥𝑡  does not change (𝑥𝑡−1 = 𝑥𝑡 =
𝑥𝑡+1). Under the above assumptions, the variational free energy 
and expected free energy, which are necessary components to 
describe the perceptual and active inferences, are expressed as 
follows. The variational free energy 𝐹(𝜙𝑥𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡−1) described in 
the FEP is expressed as 
 
𝐹(𝜙𝑥𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡−1)  
 
= 𝐸𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡)
[ln 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) − ln 𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡)]  
 
= 𝐷𝐾𝐿[𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡)||𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡|𝑠𝑡)] − ln 𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑠𝑡), (1) 
where 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) is the approximate posterior distribution of 
𝑥𝑡 , and 𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡)  is a generative model that stores the 
causal relationship of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡 under 𝑎𝑡−1. The 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) 
is made to minimize the variational free energy. The expected 
free energy 𝐺(𝜙𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑎𝑡) described in the FEP is expressed as 
 
𝐺(𝜙𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝑎𝑡)  
 
= 𝐸𝑞(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1,𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
𝐹(𝜙𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑎𝑡)  
 
= 𝐸𝑞(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1,𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
𝐸𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
  
 
  [ln 𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1) − ln 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑡+1)]  
 
= 𝐸𝑞(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1,𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
[𝐸𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
  
 
  [ln 𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1) − ln 𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1)]  
 
  −𝐸𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
ln 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1)]  
 
= 𝐸𝑞(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1,𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
𝐷𝐾𝐿[𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)||𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1)]  
 
+𝐸𝑞(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1,𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
[−𝐸𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)
ln 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1)]. (2) 
𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑡+1)  is factorized into 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1)𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1) 
since 𝑥𝑡+1  and 𝑎𝑡  are independent. The next action is 
selected to minimize the expected free energy. 
 The purpose of perceptual inference is to find 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) 
that minimizes 𝐹(𝜙𝑥𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡−1) . Since the second term of 
Equation (1) is composed of 𝑎𝑡−1 and the current 𝑠𝑡 , which 
have already been determined, the purpose is achieved by 
changing 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) with 𝜙𝑥𝑡 to make the first term close to 
zero. When the first term is made close to zero, 
𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡|𝑠𝑡)~𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡). Active inference aims to find action 
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Figure 1 Overview of problem setting to consider sensorimotor 
visual perception. 
  
𝑎𝑡 that minimizes 𝐺(𝜙𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝑎𝑡). Since 𝑎𝑡 is included only in 
the second term (hereafter called uncertainty), the purpose is 
achieved by minimizing the uncertainty.  
Proposed Embodied System 
for Sensorimotor Visual Perception 
An embodiment is the key to achieving sensorimotor visual 
perception based on the FEP. The proposed embodied system 
is configured by a body and memory. The body has an ocular 
motor system for controlling the attention position. In our 
problem setting shown in Figure 1, the vision sensor is the 
body. The body has thus limited spatial observation ability, 
which means that it can only observe a small area of the 
environment that is focused upon. The memory is not 
photographic but is a generative model that contains prior 
knowledge about the environment, and that knowledge is 
classified. By limiting body and memory abilities and operating 
according to the FEP, the proposed embodied system 
repeatedly performs perceptual and active inference. Figure 2 
shows the processing flow of sensorimotor visual perception 
with the proposed system. In perceptual inference, a current 
sensory input image 𝑠𝑡 is generated using an attention image 
obtained from the environment and the past attention images 
obtained up to the current time point. Then, 𝑠𝑡 is input to the 
generative model 𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡)  to calculate an approximate 
posterior distribution 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) and an approximate posterior 
image 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) which is a conversion of 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) into 
an image format. In active inference, the uncertainty of the 
expected sensory input images 𝑠𝑡+1  is calculated using 
𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) . After that, an attention position having the 
minimum value is selected from an uncertainty map in which 
uncertainty is mapped for each 𝑠𝑡+1 . In generating 𝑠𝑡  (the 
first process of perceptual inference), the attention image 
obtained from the environment and the past attention images 
are composed while maintaining their relative attention 
positions to generate 𝑠𝑡 . In calculating 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡)  and 
𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡)  (the second process of perceptual inference), 
𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑠𝑡)  is implemented with a combination of a 
variational autoencoder (VAE) and a fully connected neural 
network (FNN), which is inspired by the idea of auxiliary loss 
in GoogleNet (Szegedy, C. et al., 2015). The VAE contains 
prior knowledge about the environment, and the FNN classifies 
the prior knowledge in the latent space generated in the VAE. 
The combination of the VAE and FNN is pre-trained, which 
corresponds to human “experience.” The pre-training is 
equivalent to changing 𝜙𝑥𝑡 in Equation (1) to make the first 
term of that equation closer to zero. Although 𝜙𝑥𝑡 is updated 
in the long term, it is fixed in the short term from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡. 
The 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) and 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) are calculated by inputting 
the 𝑠𝑡 to the combination of the VAE and FNN. Calculation 
of uncertainty (the first process of active inference) uses 
𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡). Uncertainty is the expected information amount 
of 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1), which is the probability distribution of 𝑠𝑡+1 
with action 𝑎𝑡 as a parameter, which is conditioned by 𝑥𝑡+1. 
Conditioning by 𝑥𝑡+1(= 𝑥𝑡) is interpreted as extracting 𝑠𝑡+1 
from 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡). The 𝑠𝑡+1 is composed of the current 𝑠𝑡 
and the candidate attention images surrounding it. 
Parameterizing 𝑎𝑡  is interpreted as assuming the candidate 
attention images. Under these interpretations, the information 
amount of 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡+1) is calculated as that of 𝑠𝑡+1. The 
information amount of 𝑠𝑡+1 is the entropy of the approximate 
posterior distribution calculated by inputting 𝑠𝑡+1  to 
𝑝𝑎𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑠𝑡). Since 𝑠𝑡+1 is deterministically calculated from 
one 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) , the expected-value calculation is not 
Past attention
images
5
Sensory input
image 𝑠𝑡
VAE
A
p
p
ro
xi
m
at
e 
p
o
st
er
io
r
d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
𝑞
𝑥
𝑡|
𝜙
𝑥
𝑡
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Approximate posterior
image 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔 𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡
5
5
…
𝑠𝑡
Candidate
attention
image
Uncertainty =
Set of approximate posterior
entropies of each expected 
sensory input image
Attention position that
minimizes entropy is selected
Environmental
state 𝑥𝑡
Attention image Attention position
Uncertainty map
<Perceptual inference> <Active inference>
FNN
Sensory-input-
image generation
Attention-position selectionApproximate posterior
calculation
Uncertainty calculation
One of
expected
sensory
input images
𝑠𝑡+1
G
en
er
at
ed
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 c
an
d
id
at
e
Approximate posterior
image 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔 𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑡
System
Body Memory
Environment
Generative
model
𝑝𝑎𝑡−1 𝑥𝑡, 𝑠𝑡
Figure 2 Processing flow of sensorimotor visual perception with proposed embodied system. 
  
required. Uncertainty is thus the set of the entropies of each 
𝑠𝑡+1. In selecting the attention position (the second process of 
active inference), an uncertainty map is generated where the 
entropy of each 𝑠𝑡+1corresponds to each attention position. An 
attention position that minimizes the entropy is selected 
according to the uncertainty map. 
 Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of the processing flow. 
The 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) is pre-trained using training data of (𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡). 
All the training data of 𝑠𝑡 are pre-processed so that the center 
of gravity of an image is shifted to the center position. During 
the operation of the proposed embodied system, the process 
from the 2nd line to the 12th line is repeated. First, an attention 
image 𝑠′𝑡  is obtained from the vision sensor. The past sensory 
input images are composed with the obtained 𝑠′𝑡  while 
maintaining each relative attention position. The center of 
gravity of the composed image is calculated, and the composed 
image is shifted so that the center of gravity is located at the 
center position of the image. The shifted composed image is an 
𝑠𝑡 . Then, 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡)  is calculated by inputting 𝑠𝑡  to 
𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡). After that, the sub function starting from the 14th 
line is called to generate expected sensory input images 𝑠𝑡+1. 
In the sub function, an 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) is calculated by inputting 
𝑠𝑡 to 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡). A template image is generated by detecting a 
bounding rectangle area of non-zero pixels in 𝑠𝑡  and 
extracting the area from 𝑠𝑡. Template matching is carried out 
in the 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) , and the representative position of the 
current 𝑠𝑡, 𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑟 , is obtained. To calculate the next candidate 
attention positions 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 , a candidate region of 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 is set. 
The candidate region is a region obtained by adding a fixed 
margin pixel to a region of 𝑠𝑡 in 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡). The region of 
𝑠𝑡 is defined by 𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑟  and the size of the template image. The 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡  are calculated by sliding the window with the fixed stride 
pixel in the candidate region. The window is the size of 𝑠′𝑡 . 
The representative positions of all the window positions during 
sliding are 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 . The 𝑠𝑡+1  are generated by extracting the 
region of the 𝑠𝑡 and the region of the next candidate attention 
images 𝑠′𝑡+1  from  𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡). The region of the 𝑠𝑡  is 
defined by 𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑟  and the size of the template image, as 
mentioned above. The region of the 𝑠′𝑡+1  are defined by 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡  and the size of 𝑠′𝑡+1. The extracted images are clipped 
or applied with zero-padding to have the same size as 𝑠𝑡. Each 
approximate posterior distribution 𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)  is 
calculated by inputting each image included in 𝑠𝑡+1  to 
𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡). Note that 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) is calculated using the current 
𝑠𝑡, while 𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1) is calculated using 𝑠𝑡+1. The entropy 
of each 𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1)  is calculated and added to the 
uncertainty map 𝑀. Finally, the attention position having the 
minimum value in 𝑀 is defined as the next attention position. 
 
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of processing flow 
1: while system is operating do: 
2:   obtain attention image 𝑠′𝑡  
3:   compose past sensory input images with 𝑠′𝑡  
4:   generate sensory input image 𝑠𝑡 by shifting 
gravity point to center of composed image 
5:   calculate approximate posterior distribution 
𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) using 𝑠𝑡 and generative model 
𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡)  
6:   call generate_expected_sensory_input_image 
7: for expected sensory input images 𝑠𝑡+1: 
8:     calculate approximate posterior distribution 
𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1) using 𝑠𝑡+1[𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥] and 
𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡)  
9:     calculate entropy of 𝑞(𝑥𝑡+1|𝜙𝑥𝑡+1) 
10:     add entropy to uncertainty map 𝑀 
11:   end for 
12:   set attention position using 𝑀 
13: end while 
  
14: generate_expected_sensory_input_image 
15:   generate approximate posterior image 
𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) using 𝑠𝑡 and 𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) 
16:   generate template from 𝑠𝑡 
17:   obtain current sensory input position 𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑟  
by template matching in 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) 
18:   calculate next candidate attention positions 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡  using 𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑟  
19:   generate 𝑠𝑡+1 using 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡), 𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑟 , 
and 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡  
20 return with 𝑠𝑡+1 
 
Evaluation 
We evaluated the proposed embodied system for achieving 
sensorimotor visual perception in a character-recognition task 
with partial observation constraint. We used the MNIST dataset 
as the character dataset. The generative model was 
implemented with a convolutional VAE (Kingma, D.P. and 
Welling, M., 2014; Rezende, D. J. et al., 2014) that was robust 
against displacement and a three-layer FNN (30 units in the 
hidden layer, 10 units in the output layer, and the activation 
function of the output layer was the Softmax function). 
Training of the generative model involved 60,000 MNIST 
images (28 × 28 pixels). The stochastic variables 𝑥𝑡  of the 
approximate posterior distribution 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) were labels 0–9 
of the MNIST dataset. The size of both the sensory input image 
and approximate posterior image was 28 × 28 pixels, while the 
size of the attention image was 6 × 6 pixels. The margin pixel 
and stride pixel for generating the next candidate attention 
images were set to 3 and 1, respectively. The number of 
attention repetitions was set to 20. 
 Perceptual inference was performed during the attention 
repetitions. Figure 3 shows the transition of 𝑞(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) when 
making an attention at characters “0”, “2”, “9”, and “3”. 
Symbols A, B, C, and D in Figure 3 (a) are described later. Each 
graph plots the probability distribution for the stochastic 
variable (0–9). In each subfigure ((a)–(d)), the graph on the left 
shows the distribution for the 1st to 10th attentions in order 
from the top, and the graph on the right shows the distribution 
for the 11th to 20th attentions in order from the top. The image 
on the right side of each graph is the corresponding 
approximate posterior image 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡). Regardless of the 
characters, the probability of “1” was maximum from the 1st to 
the 2nd attention, and the 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) at that time contained 
a shape that was difficult to recognize as a character. After the 
3rd attention, the probability of the characters different from 
the correct characters “0”, “2”, “9”, and “3” changed to the 
maximum, and the 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) at that time contained shapes 
similar to numbers “5” and “7”. When making an attention at 
characters “0”, “2”, and “9”, the probability of correct 
  
characters was maximum at the 20th attention, and “0”, “2”, 
and “9” appeared in the 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) . On the other hand, 
when making an attention at character “3”, the probability of 
“7” was maximum from the 4th to 13th and from the 15th to 
19th attentions, and the probability of “2” was maximum even 
at the 20th attention. The 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑔(𝑥𝑡|𝜙𝑥𝑡) contained a part of 
“3”, not the entire “3”. 
 Active inference was performed during attention repetitions. 
Figure 4 shows the uncertainty map at the 1st, 4th, 13th, and 
20th attentions (corresponding to A, B, C, and D in Figure 3 
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Figure 3 Transition of approximate posterior distribution along with attention repetition. Each 
subfigure (a), (b), (c), and (d) corresponds to making attention at the characters “0”, “2”, “9”, 
and “3”, respectively. 
  
(a), respectively) when making an attention at “0”. The vertical 
(x) and horizontal (y) axes of the maps indicate the position 
coordinates of the upper left corner of the candidate attention 
image. The values of the uncertainty map of the 1st and 20th 
attentions were biased toward the minimum value, whereas the 
values of the uncertainty map of the 4th and 13th attentions 
were dispersed. 
 Sensorimotor visual perception was performed by repeating 
perceptual and active inferences. Figure 5 shows attention 
images and sensory input images for each number of attentions 
when making attentions from “0” to “9”. Each subset of two 
rows corresponds to making attentions from “0” to “9”. The 
first row shows the attention images (The rectangle area of each 
image is the attention image). The second row shows the 
sensory input images. As the number of attention repetition 
increased, the visible area of a character became larger, and at 
the 20th attention, except “3”, most of the characters were 
visible enough to be recognized by humans as numbers. At the 
20th attention of “3”, however, a part of ”3” was missing. 
 To analyze the case of making an attention at “3”, the initial 
attention position was changed. Figure 6 shows transition of 
approximate posterior distribution, attention image, and 
sensory input image when the initial attention position was 
changed to a position different from those in Figures 3 and 5 in 
the case of making an attention at “3”. Similar to Figure 3 (d), 
the probability of “1” was maximum from the 1st to 4th 
attentions, and the approximate posterior image at that time 
contained shapes that were difficult to recognize as characters. 
Different from Figure 3 (d), the probabilities of “1”, “3”, and 
“5” changed to maximum after the 5th attention, and the 
probability of correct character “3” reached maximum at the 
20th attention. The probability image contained “3”. 
Discussion 
In the transition of the approximate posterior distribution, the 
probability of “1” was maximun at the 1st attention for all 
characters from “0” to “9” that were verified. This is because, 
at the 1st attention, the sensory input image only includes the 
1st attention image capturing only points or short lines, and this 
is perceived as a part of “1”. In fact, the approximate posterior 
images also looked like “1.” This is similar to the situation in 
which humans temporarily labeled information (in this case, 
“1”) so that they could identify the environment based on the 
information they had collected and their experience thus far and 
moved on to the next action. 
 In the middle stage of attention repetition for most of the 
characters, a form that could not be identified as any shape was 
shown in the approximate posterior image; accordingly, the 
approximate posterior distribution fluctuated among various 
shapes during attention repetition. This situation is analogous 
to a human making a decision without a specific classification 
label, considering the various possibilities when information is 
uncertain. 
 While most characters fluctuated among various shapes in 
the middle stage of the attention, the period in which “7” was 
higher was maintained in the middle stage of the attention 
repetition when making the attention of “2”. This is because the 
shape of “2” includes the shape of “7”, and “7” appears first in 
this attention-position order. In fact, the approximate posterior 
image in the middle stage of the attention repetition was “7”. 
 In the early stages of attention repetition, the probability of 
a particular number in the approximate posterior distribution 
will not increase wherever the next attention is made. The 
Current sensory input
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Approximate posterior image
y
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x
y
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x
y
B
x
y
C
x
y
D
Figure 4 Uncertainty map when making attention at “0”. Each subfigure A, B, C, and D corresponds to 1st, 4th, 13th, and 
20th attentions, respectively. 
  
distribution of the uncertainty map is thus biased toward the 
minimum value of the uncertainty. In this case, the difference 
in the value included in the uncertainty map is mainly due to 
the random number included in the VAE calculation and 
considered to be in the situation equivalent to random selection 
of the next attention position. This is similar to a situation in 
which a human takes a random attention action to obtain clues 
in an unknown environment. 
 In the middle stage of the attention repetition, the number 
can be specified depending on the next sensory input image 
determined with attention position, so the distribution of the 
uncertainty map is more dispersed than that in the early stage 
of attention repetition. This is equivalent to a human taking 
actions to increase the certainty of a certain number when the 
likelihood of that number increases. 
 In the final stage of attention repetition, most regions of 
numbers have already become visible in the approximate 
posterior image; thus, the distribution of the uncertainty map is 
again biased toward the minimum-value side. This is a situation 
in which the probability of a particular number in the 
approximate posterior distribution has already been high, and 
the entropy of this distribution is low no matter where the next 
attention position is. For this reason, the range was smaller than 
that of the uncertainty map in the early stage of attention 
repetition in which the distribution was similarly biased. 
 In the transition of attention images, the attention-position 
movement was along the line of the character, but not a 
complete “one-stroke”. This is because the approximate 
posterior image is not necessarily the image with the correct 
number. A number different from the correct number is shown 
in the approximate posterior image from the early to middle 
stages of attention repetition, and the uncertainty is calculated 
using the approximate posterior image. Even at the final stage 
of the attention repetition, due to the randomness of the VAE, 
a random movement can also be seen along the character line.  
 When making an attention at “3”, different initial attention 
positions confirmed both cases in which the probability of 
correct characters became the highest and that of different 
characters became the highest after a fixed number of attention 
repetitions. This result suggests that the proposed system has a 
confirmation bias similar to humans that depends on what is 
obtained from the environment and prior knowledge about the 
environment. The human confirmation bias has a negative 
impact on decision-making in various fields, from politics to 
science and education (Kappes, A., 2020). Whereas, the 
confirmation bias has the advantage of adaptability to unknown 
environments. General optimization problems require complete 
models of the environment, but lack of environmental 
information and time constraints cannot provide complete 
models in most practical cases. In these cases, humans take the 
next action on the basis of the confirmation bias made of 
* Attention image is rectangular area (        )
extracted from MNIST dataset image.
Number of attention repetitions
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Figure 5 Transition of attention images and sensory input 
images. Each subset of two rows corresponds to making 
attentions from “0” to “9”. First row shows attention images* 
and second row shows sensory input images along with number 
of attention repetitions. 
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Figure 6 Attention images, sensory input images, and transition 
of approximate posterior distribution. Changes in initial 
attention position when making attention at “3” provides 
different transition patterns. 
  
previous experiences. Taking the next action (exploring action) 
enables making decisions in practical time and obtaining the 
environmental information. We believe that our results will 
help solve the previously difficult problem of triggering action 
in an unknown environment. 
Conclusion 
We proposed an embodied system based on the free energy 
principle (FEP) for sensorimotor visual perception. We 
evaluated the proposed system in a character-recognition task 
using the MNIST dataset. The proposed embodied system is 
configured by a body and memory. By limiting body and 
memory abilities and operating according to the FEP, the 
proposed system triggers an action that moves an attention 
position and repeatedly performs perceptual and active 
inferences. In the evaluation, as the number of repetitions 
increases, the attention area moves continuously, gradually 
reducing the uncertainty of the characters. Finally, the 
probability of the correct character becomes the highest among 
the characters. It was thus confirmed that the embodied system 
greatly contributes to achieving sensorimotor visual 
perception. Moreover, changing the initial attention position 
provides a different final distribution, suggesting that the 
proposed system has a confirmation bias similar to humans. We 
believe that these results will help solve the difficult problem 
of triggering action in an unknown environment. 
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